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JOHN DEWEY'S IDEAS ABOUT THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
BY EDWARD J. BORDEAU 
Some criticisms that have been directed against John Dewey's politi- 
cal theory reveal a general misunderstanding of his intent. Such notables 
as Richard Hofstadter, Morton White, and Reinhold Niebuhr have at 
various times penned objections to what they have labeled Dewey's 
"methodolatry" and his "intellectualism." Even within the pragmatic 
fold, we find Morton White's charge of "formalism" accepted; in his 
most recent work, H. S. Thayer has penned: "Dewey is able to sug- 
gest how problems are to be encountered and resolved but not what the 
solutions are or should be. The temptation has been to search Dewey's 
writings for an answer to moral difficulties or intellectual doubts."' 
Certainly Dewey does not offer us final or settled solutions but this is 
not the issue; at various times in his long career, he thought seriously 
and deeply about many social and moral problems, and it is our conten- 
tion that he provided his liberal followers with some answers to some of 
these problems. His social and political activities were a lived extension 
of his political theorizing. From the First World War to the end of the 
Depression and after-as long as he was actively involved in social and 
political movements-he applied his theory to practice in concrete en- 
gagements. Dewey's appeal for the use of intelligence in social change 
can easily lend itself to caricature as long as intelligence retains its scho- 
lastic connotation. Intelligence-in-action can best be exemplified in 
Dewey's own active political and social work. His theory and practice 
are of one piece, and the criticisms, especially of Morton White and 
Reinhold Niebuhr, would readily vanish in the light of the political 
activities Dewey undertook just before and throughout the Depression. 
Where Dewey seems obscure in theory we should allow his practice to 
illuminate his meaning. I feel it would be of great value in clarifying 
Dewey's whole approach to social and political theory to examine in 
some detail how he applied his own convictions to action. 
John Dewey was quite active in writing, lecturing, and propagan- 
dizing during the Depression years. Our primary concern in this 
article is the role he played in the efforts of the League for Independent 
Political Action to sponsor a third party from 1928 until the collapse of 
this project in 1936. Concurrent with this movement is Dewey's work 
with the People's Lobby in advocating social welfare programs to meet 
the crises generated by the Depression. 
'H. S. Thayer, Meaning and Action, A Critical History of Pragmatism 
(New York, 1968), 182. 
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Yet it is significant that both the LIPA and the PL were formed 
prior to the great market crash of October 1929. Dewey, together with 
many liberal-minded intellectuals, was never blind to the inherent 
weaknesses of American capitalism-even in the great "era of pros- 
perity," from 1922 to 1929. Most intellectuals knew that periodic de- 
pressions were inevitable under the system of finance-capitalism2 
Even though reform agitation of the progressive genre faded into rel- 
ative insignificance in the post war years, liberals like George Norris 
and Robert La Follette continued to sponsor welfare programs. Yet 
the social programs Dewey had advocated in 1908 and 1918 were far 
removed from serious consideration in an era given over entirely to 
Herbert Hoover's "rugged individualism." 
In 1922, the Conference for Progressive Political Action (CPPA) 
was formed, offering as a third-party candidate for the 1924 presiden- 
tial election Robert La Follette, Sr. His platform pleased Dewey as it 
combined his reformism with isolation and the outlawry of war. Dew- 
ey's voting record indicates rwhat he himself confessed, that he was an 
independent; yet most of nis votes were cast for third-party candidates 
and liberals. Believing there "are no absolutes in politics," Dewey 
confessed that he voted for Grover Cleveland in 1884. Then in 1912 he 
voted for Eugene Debs, the socialist who was incarcerated during the 
War for dissent. In 1916, he voted for Woodrow Wilson and for Charles 
E. Hughes as governor of New York State.3 In 1923, he worked and 
voted for La Follette.4 Just to complete the known record, in 1928, 
Dewey met and backed Alfred A. Smith; 1932 and 1936 went to Nor- 
man Thomas for president (in 1938, Dewey voted for Thomas as 
governor of New York State).5 The only other indication of his later 
voting record reveals that he voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944.6 
The purpose of a recitation of these facts is to illustrate that for a long 
time Dewey realized the importance of third-party agitation in terms 
of offering the public real alternatives. What he especially wanted was 
a party to embrace and propose progressive programs, for progres- 
sivism sprang from the practical idealism of the American spirit. 
2John Dewey, "Prospects for a Third Party," New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 
278. 
3Dewey, "Wallace vs a New Party," New Leader, 31 (Oct. 30, 1948), 14; 
"The Hughes Campaign," New Republic, 8 (Oct. 28, 1916), 320. 
4Dewey, New Leader, 31 (Oct. 30, 1948), 14; "Dewey aids La Follette," 
N. Y. Times (Oct. 23, 1924). 
5Dewey, "Why I am for Smith," New Republic, 56 (Nov. 7, 1928), 320; 
"Education, Democracy, and Socialized Economy," Social Frontier, 5 (Dec., 1938),72. 
6"John Dewey, at 85, Defends Doctrines," N. Y. Times (Oct. 20, 1944), 32. 
"He distrusts the 'isolationism' of the Republican Party and intends to vote for 
President Roosevelt as the man most likely to 'lead us forward.' " 
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Robert La Follette, running on the progressive platform, made a 
good showing in 1924; he gained 5,000,000 votes, one sixth of the total 
votes cast.7 But in the following years, protest politics declined and the 
CPPA disintegrated. By the time of the 1928 presidential election 
Americans had little to choose from in the contest between Alfred A. 
Smith and Herbert Hoover. John Dewey made the acquaintance of 
Smith that year and decided to back him.8 He later acknowledged that 
the intrinsic ties to the financial world on the part of both parties re- 
duced their difference to insignificance, for both served the interests of 
big business.9 
Dewey consistently allied himself with every effort to educate the 
public about the economic and political realities of the times-even 
prior to the market crash of 1929-for only as so equipped could col- 
lective public intelligence become an operational force in self-determi- 
nation. Such groups as the LIPA and the PL were not political parties 
but educational organizations attempting to give direction to inchoate 
sentiments aroused in times of crisis. 
Dewey was not one of the original group of political dissidents who, 
after the election of Hoover in 1928, sought to organize a new party 
along progressive lines.10 Yet the inspiration and philosophy behind 
the organization was provided by Dewey's The Public and Its Problems 
(1927)." After the election, in December, the Nation pointed out the 
bankruptcy of both parties calling for a new political effort. Neither of 
the major parties was prepared to address itself to the problems of 
economic reorganization, and the major role of the new party would be 
to sponsor long-term industrial and economic reform. Paul H. Douglas, 
an economist from the University of Chicago, organized the LIPA in 
the summer of 1929 as the educational and directive nucleus of a radi- 
cal new party. 
Dewey observed that the progressive sentiment-so much a part 
of American political life-was neither dead nor sleeping, but dif- 
fused. As unorganized it was impotent; the LIPA offered itself as the 
7Donald R. McCoy, Angry Voices, Left-of-center Politics in the New Deal Era 
(Lawrence, Kansas, 1958), 320. 
8Dewey, New Republic, 56 (Nov. 7, 1928), 320. 
9Dewey, "The Need for a New Party, I: The Present Crisis," New Republic, 
66 (March 18, 1931), 115. "For the old parties are so firmly entrenched throughout 
the nation, and the organizations are so closely bound to the business system that 
unorganized individuals feel themselves helpless." 
'ODewey, New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 278. 
"Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, The Crisis of the Old 
Order (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 142. "Paul Douglas organized the League for 
Independent Political Action in 1929 as a means for fulfilling Dewey's The Public 
and Its Problems." 
This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
70 EDWARD J. BORDEAU 
clearing house for independent radical groups in the work to create 
an effective third party. What liberals needed, he urged, was a set of 
principles, primarily economic, around which to rally.12 Dewey served 
as the LIPA's chairman and its national committee boasted the mem- 
bership of such renowns as Stuart Chase, Oswald Garrison Villard, 
Harry Laidler, and Reinhold Niebuhr.13 
Throughout 1930, the LIPA undertook a massive educational and 
organizational campaign. Dewey, lending the support of his great 
name, signed form letters appealing for membership, and during the 
first nine months of its existence the LIPA gained 2,500 members. In 
the 1930 elections, the LIPA supported and successfully ran several in- 
dependents for office. The League was encouraged by the election of 
Farm-Laborites in Minnesota, as governor and United States Sen- 
ator.14 With these successes behind it, the LIPA sought to persuade 
the progressive block in Congress to openly support a new third party 
organized along a progressive economic program. 
Dewey, as national chairman of the LIPA, wrote an open letter to 
Senator George Norris on December 25, 1930, urging him to "re- 
nounce both of these old parties and to help give birth to a new party 
based upon the principles of planning and control for the purpose of 
building happier lives, a more just society and that peaceful world 
which was the dream of Him whose birthday we celebrate this Christ- 
mas Day?"15 Dewey estimated that Norris might be more vulnerable 
to such a suggestion at this time, for in the November election, the 
executive director of the Republican National Committee, Robert H. 
Lucas, had stated that "Senator Norris did not belong to the Repub- 
lican party as the latter was 'too socially minded'."16 Lucas had actu- 
ally spent money and issued literature in an attempt to prevent Norris 
from winning the senatorial race in Nebraska. 
Dewey wrote that he had been informed by senators and repre- 
sentatives of both parties that "the formation of a third party" is in- 
evitable and "predicted that it could win the Presidency by 1940."17 
Dewey advised Norris that the Republican party was committed to 
laissez-faire and "rugged individualism," whereas "you stand for so- 
cial planning and social control." "New wine can't be put in old bot- 
tles," so Norris should defect and join a new party, for "the new politi- 
cal philosophy needs it own incarnation."18 
Norris, however, declined; he planned to remain at least a nominal 
Republican, despite the fact that he had openly supported Smith over 
'2Dewey, "What Do Liberals Want?" Outlook and Independent, 153 (Oct. 16, 1929), 
261. '3Schlesinger, 198. 
"McCoy, 8. '5N. Y. Times (Dec. 26, 1930). 
6lbid. '7Ibid. 181bid. 
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Hoover who, he believed, had turned the country over to "power 
trust."19 He preferred to put his trust in independent voting rather 
than to form a new party. 
John Dewey responded; in an address delivered on December 30, 
1930, before the New History Society at the Community Church lo- 
cated on Park Avenue at Thirty-fourth Street (2,000 were in atten- 
dance), he denounced Republican insurgents, like Norris and Borah, 
who were waiting for "a tide on which they can ride without having to 
take risks. It is too bad they lack courage." They fail to see how ripe 
the time is for a third party, for "just as the Republican Party was 
born in the irrepressible conflict against the extension of chattel slavery, 
so the new party will be born to liberate us from the enslavement of 
governmental agencies to selfish and predatory interest."20 
This exchange, although it brought the LIPA third-party agita- 
tion into the public eye, tended to alienate congressional progressives 
who, consequently, declined to invite the LIPA membership to par- 
ticipate in the 1931 Conference of Progressives. Nonetheless, the 
publicity paid off; early in 1931 The New Republic announced enthusi- 
astic support for LIPA aims. Dewey was asked to write a series of 
articles explaining its programs. They appeared in March and April in 
four consecutive articles. 
Both major parties, Dewey declared,-the parties of Jefferson and 
Lincoln-are philosophically anachronistic but even more are irre- 
trievably tied to the interests of business and finance. It would be close 
to magic, he suggested, to expect "that those with privilege will volun- 
tarily remedy the breakdown they have created."21 The government 
is not in the hands of the people but in the hands of the captains of in- 
dustry. They control the government as well as utilities and the press 
but while they rule, they do not govern. The words above reveal that 
Dewey never dogmatized his belief in voluntary, social cooperation; 
the implicit suggestion is that irresponsible business must, if needs be, 
be forced to give up its privileges. 
Since both parties subserve the interests of finance-capital, a new 
radical party concerned with returning control of the government to 
the people is desperately needed. The American middle class, the tra- 
ditional seat of progressive sentiment and idealism, is waiting for direc- 
tion. Neither the Socialists, the Communists, nor the older parties 
'9"Norris Declines to Head New Party: Still a Republican," N. Y. Times 
(Dec. 27, 1930). 
20"Dewey on Norris' Rejection to Form a Third Party," N. Y. Times 
(Dec. 31, 1930), 3. 
2Dewey, "The Necd for a New Party, II: The Breakdown of the Old Order," 
New Republic, 66 (March 25, 1931), 150. 
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are congenial to this progressivism; nor are they interested in changing 
the present order, at least in the characteristically American way. 
Policies of the last fifty years reveal that politics has been con- 
cerned with production, not consumption. Piecemeal reform will get 
us nowhere; we need, he urged, to perform an about-face and to reorga- 
nize along totally different lines.22 In articulating the policies for the 
new party, he recommended a planned economy with the possible 
socialization of utilities, power, banking, and credit. By this he meant 
governmental control and perhaps even ownership if it seemed neces- 
sary. He also advised the government regulation of the radio and press, 
and advocated the taxation of land value.23 
Throughout 1931, Dewey continually attacked the inactivity of the 
Hoover administration through the People's Lobby Bulletin. In May, 
he demonstrated the gross inequities of the present economic order by 
showing that eighty percent of the nation's wealth belonged to four 
percent of the population. As a solution he urged a sharp increase in the 
taxation of the higher brackets to pay for relief programs. He coun- 
seled Hoover to call a special session of Congress to handle the grow- 
ing social and economic problems of the Depression. When Hoover, 
unconvinced of the seriousness of the depression, rejected the proposal 
to call such a session to deal with unemployment, saying we can't legis- 
late ourselves out of trouble, Dewey hastened to point out the relief 
potential of unemployment insurance and public works. Is it, Dewey 
asked, that Hoover is afraid to tax the rich friends who gave funds to 
his campaign? 24 
At this time, Dewey also had critical words for the Congressional 
Progressives who had held their Conference of Progressives in Wash- 
ington in March (and who had not invited the LIPA). They had failed 
to exert sufficient force on the administration in demanding a special 
session of Congress on unemployment. He reminded Robert La Fol- 
lette of his 1924 progressive pledge and urged him to fight for them 
now. 
Dewey, however, was more incensed with Hoover's seeming in- 
difference and insensitivity to the deprivation and suffering all across 
the country. With ten million Americans unemployed, Hoover's dis- 
missal of the depression as transitory was the height of blind devotion 
to the system of special privilege and contempt for labor. Hoover's 
22"Who Might Make a New Party?" Ibid. (April 1, 1931), 177. "On the one 
hand, it implies the possibility and the desirability of boring from within by methods 
which will eventually produce a complete face-about and reorganization." 
23"Policies for a New Party," Ibid. (April 8, 1931), 204. 
24"Full Warehouses and Empty Stomachs," People's Lobby Bulletin (May, 
1931),I,i, 1. 
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strategy of aiding capital to stimulate production was destined to fail 
as the real solution must focus on consumption. 
Throughout 1931, Dewey continued to propagandize for his social- 
ism by letter, articles, and radio broadcasts; this he did as the official 
spokesman for the LIPA and as president of the People's Lobby. By 
1932, the LIPA was well organized; the LIPA attempted to get the 
Socialist Party and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party to merge with 
the LIPA; although both refused, they did give their support.25 
As the LIPA looked to the 1932 elections, it faced many obstacles 
to a concerted effort. In addition to the Socialist Party which wanted to 
go it alone there was the national Farm-Labor Party, the Jobless Party 
founded by Father James R. Cox, and the Liberty Party. With such 
divisiveness on the one hand and the strong appeal to liberals and pro- 
gressives of the democratic governor of New York State, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt on the other, prospects for third-party activities appeared 
dismal. At first LIPA officials attacked Roosevelt but later changed 
their tactics, claiming that Roosevelt's liberalism could never be effec- 
tive from within the democratic machine, for it was so intrinsically 
tied to the business world. Instead of reforming his party, the party 
would reform him. 
Early in 1932, the Socialists and the LIPA began to work more 
closely together, even if separately. In February, Norman Thomas 
and other LIPA officials advocated a third party similar to the 
British Labor Party; however, they admitted that its efficacy as a real 
force in American politics might require several years to mature.26 
The following month, Dewey warned that if the major parties failed to 
nominate a progressive candidate for president, a third party would 
certainly be initiated. Norman Thomas balked at this prediction, for 
he would withhold support for such a party. It would be a wasted effort 
like the La Follette coalition of 1924. Obviously, Thomas was planning 
to run himself as a third-party presidential candidate. 
As a result, the LIPA looked to the Minnesota Farmer-Labor 
Party for 1932 but by spring that organization had reached an informal 
agreement with the Roosevelt camp. Consequently, unable to enlist 
support for a candidate to run against the two major parties from 
either the Socialists, Farmer-Laborites, as well as Congressional pro- 
gressives, the LIPA by May had jettisoned the third-party idea for 
1932. At the LIPA convention that year, held in Cleveland, the execu- 
25The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party played an important role in Minnesota 
politics throughout the Depression and after; this group finally merged with the 
Democratic Party in 1944. Hubert H. Humphrey was instrumental in bringing about 
this merger; the new organization which sponsored him as a mayoral candidate in 
Minneapolis with success in 1945 was called the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party 
(DFL). 26Dewey, New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 278. 
This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
74 EDWARD J. BORDEAU 
tive committee decided to endorse Norman Thomas for president. 
The LIPA developed, however, the most comprehensive platform 
offered by any political group-a platform "reminiscent of the Populist, 
Bull Moose, and 1924 Progressive platform."27 It was bolder and went 
further than the New Deal; called the Four-Year Presidential Plan, it 
asked for three to five million dollars for public works and $250,000,000 
for direct relief annually. The plan called for an increase in taxa- 
tion on higher-bracket incomes, and recommended larger corporation 
and inheritance taxes; in addition, the plan advocated the establish- 
ment of worker's insurance, old age pension, the abolition of child 
labor, and a six-hour work day. The program supported public owner- 
ship of power, utilities, coal, oil, the railroad, and advocated a reduc- 
tion of the tariff rates and aid to farmers. On the international scene, 
the LIPA platform urged United States participation in the League of 
Nations, the World Court, and recognition of Russia. 
As the national chairman of the LIPA, it would not be presumptu- 
ous to suggest that Dewey had some influence in the formation of this 
platform. Certainly he gave his adherence to its policies for he con- 
tinued to advocate them throughout the Depression. The only quali- 
fication he was likely to make would probably have pertained to Amer- 
ican participation in the League and World Court. We have never 
discovered any retraction of his earlier rejection of the League and 
World Court; on the contrary statements have been found that demon- 
strate that as late as 1945 he still refused to accept any international 
organization formed solely for political as opposed to economic pur- 
poses.28 The LIPA platform offered the American public "a more 
practical and practicable form of idealism" than any other political 
organization of the day and was by and large the most comprehen- 
sive.2 Although the LIPA decided to back the Socialist Party, they 
voted 47 to 8 not to support any communist candidates, for their aims 
and methods were not congenial to the American progressive tradi- 
tion; the LIPA fancied itself the organ of that practical idealism, at- 
tempting to give it expression and direction. 
Dewey predicted, as the elections drew near, that many votes for 
Roosevelt would in reality be votes against Hoover.30 Many inde- 
pendents hesitated to vote outside the Democratic Party lest they 
thereby aid the cause of Hoover. As a result, Roosevelt won by a land- 
slide, with Norman Thomas polling only 884,781 votes-two percent 
of the total votes cast. However, Dewey was not disspirited by the out- 
27McCoy, 18. 
28John Dewey, "Democratic versus Coercive International Organization: The 
Realism of Jane Addams," in Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 
1915-1945 (New York, 1945), xv. 29McCoy, 20. 
30Dewey, New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 279. 
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come, for he interpreted the elections as "a vote for new realignment 
in political measures if not for it in political parties." He contended 
that the Western agrarians had rejected the Republican Party for its 
failure to solve the nation's economic problems and that they stood 
ready to repudiate the Democratic Party too if it also failed. Dewey 
was confident that it would: "It will fail. Somebody must see to it 
that four years from now they do not simply swing back into the Re- 
publican Party which will be the promising party."31 The campaign 
had been, at least, educative and some gains were made in the election 
of four new Farmer-Labor Party congressmen. Slowly the LIPA was 
gaining political experience and they began to look in different direc- 
tions for new support and strength. More and more they turned to 
labor and agriculture and less to intellectuals and socialists. 
One obvious reason for turning away from the socialists was the 
extremely poor showing they made at the polls. Attempts were made 
to analyze their unexpected failure. Gabriel Heatter, in an "Open Let- 
ter to Norman Thomas," blasted those dogmatic socialists who were 
unwilling to change the name of the party-a name erroneously, of 
course, associated with "a breakdown of the American home." He 
blamed their failure on their unwillingness to join in a third-party 
movement more congenial to Americans, a movement supporting a 
platform hardly distinguishable from that of the Socialists: "Surely 
the amazingly small vote you received in this unparalleled economic 
emergency is the final answer to those who insist that they will not 
change the name, the appeal, the control, or remove a dot or dash 
from the platform."32 
Norman Thomas replied. The need for a new name and less dog- 
matism, he wrote, was a common criticism, but not the real cause for 
the defeat of the Socialist Party. He blamed those progressives who 
made their votes a negative one by voting for Roosevelt as a protest 
against Hoover and he accused them of a lack of vision and dedication. 
Although he appreciated LIPA support, he claimed it did not help 
much and contributed little to his campaign. Socialism alone, he as- 
serted, has the vision and a philosophy powerful enough, once under- 
stood by the people, to mobilize them. The name stays, he wrote, and 
urged leftists to join him. Then he attacked the LIPA for being ideo- 
logically weak and impotent; it lacked a decided program and philos- 
ophy of political action, disdaining as it does contact with the working 
masses.33 
3"News Bulletin of the League for Independent Political Action" (Nov.-Dec., 
1932), 1. 
32Gabriel Heatter, "The Future of the Socialist Party: Open Letter to Norman 
Thomas," Nation, 135 (Dec. 14, 1932), 584. 
33Norman Thomas, "Norman Thomas Replies," Ibid., 585. 
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The national chairman of the League for Independent Political 
Action could not let this criticism pass. Dewey admitted the need for a 
new, strong political philosophy, but he seriously doubted that the 
Socialist Party "alone" could supply it. To attack the LIPA as weak 
in commitment showed, he thought, some grave misunderstanding of 
its aims and philosophy. First, he pointed out, the LIPA is not a politi- 
cal party but an organization seeking to unite dissident groups so as to 
present a united front in the formation of a third party. The LIPA's 
philosophy is not a watered down socialism as Thomas had charged, 
but an expression of the American democratic faith, believing that 
the direction of political action must be dictated by the social condi- 
tions and needs of the time. As such, its program is tentative and ex- 
perimental, but nonetheless definite; it too espouses the socialization 
of production and distribution, since this is clearly a need of the times. 
To achieve such goals, however, the LIPA knows very well that it 
needs power which can be had only through concerted dissident politi- 
cal action.34 Instead of attacking various liberal groups, like the 
LIPA and the middle class in general, Thomas and the Socialist Party 
ought to work for unity; Dewey urged Thomas to join with the LIPA 
and other progressive and radical groups in 1933. These same criti- 
cisms that Dewey directed at the Socialists, he repeated against pro- 
ponents of Marxism. In response to Reinhold Niebuhr, Dewey rejected 
such dogmatic schemes as foreign to the experimental temper, for 
constructive reorganization must be partial and tentative; definiteness 
and decisiveness are not alien to such a method, for it can as easily sup- 
port deep commitment and radical political action as can the Marxist 
ideology.35 
By March 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed leadership of 
his depressed country, economic collapse had reached high tide. The 
Hoover administration, turning a deaf ear to pleas for direct relief for 
the mass of unemployed, had sought rather to revive the economy by 
granting financial aid to business. Dewey, as President of the People's 
Lobby, had from the beginning held that the key to recovery lay in the 
purchasing power of the people and for that reason had supported un- 
employment insurance and public works.36 It became immediately 
apparent that only a change of leadership in Washington-to one 
sympathetic to these needs-could force these programs into legisla- 
tion, since it was only too obvious that financial and industrial leaders 
would not willingly surrender their privileges; they would have to be 
restrained by the government and the first step in that direction was to 
34Dewey, "The Future of Radical Political Action," Nation, 136 (Jan. 4, 1933), 8. 
35"Unity and Progress," World Tomorrow, 16 (March, 1933), 232. 
36"Prosperity Depends on Building From Bottom Up," People's Lobby Bulletin 
(April, 1932), I, xii, 1. 
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force them to pay higher taxes: 
Our entire history and experience proves that the financial and industrial 
leaders of the nation will not make these changes voluntarily-they will not, 
except under compulsion, surrender their most profitable share of a system 
which has concentrated four-fifths of the nation's wealth in the hands of 
one twenty-fifths of the people. 
The Federal Government alone has the power to force the wealthy owners 
of the nation to surrender their control over the lives and destinies of the 
overwhelming majority of the American people and the first step is to com- 
pel them to pay taxes commensurate in sacrifice, with that of people with 
very small incomes.37 (Dewey's emphasis) 
Since the Democratic Party was anchored to financial interests as 
much as the Republican Party, Roosevelt's New Deal would have to be 
compromised. Despite the improvements that were beginning to be felt 
in May, two months after his inauguration, the LIPA officials still re- 
mained skeptical, but the rank and file members marveled at the emer- 
gency measures Roosevelt managed to push through the special session 
of Congress he had immediately called. Dewey, writing in Common 
Sense, which had become "the official organ of the League," warned 
that Rooseveltian measures "are both somewhat blind and halfhearted, 
and their chief desire is to bolster and repair the present system- 
which means as sure as night follows day an ultimate return of com- 
plete power and rule to the very elements that have brought the nation 
to its present pass."38 League officials were not appeased by Roose- 
velt's efforts, although they did recognize and applaud his successes. 
They were convinced he had compromised too easily with the older or- 
der. Hence, they thought the need for a new radical third party was 
imperative. The LIPA called a Continental Congress for May, 1933, 
to start the machinery rolling for the formation of such a party. Dewey 
made pleas for unity among radicals in this movement; in referring 
to the deprivation and growing unemployment, he wrote: "The League 
for Independent Political Action proposes to do something about it. 
In May the League will assemble a national congress in Washington, 
D.C. to organize a united New Party. Earnestly, I invite you to join 
us."39 US  39 
To the dissatisfaction of the LIPA, the conference, although well 
attended-by such varying groups as the Farm Holiday Association, 
the Conference for Progressive Labor Action, the needle trade unions, 
and the Non-Partisan League-tended to be dominated by the Social- 
ists and nothing much was accomplished. However, as the summer 
37"You Must Act to Get Congress to Act," Ibid. (May, 1932), II, i, 1. 
38"Imperative Need: A New Radical Party," Common Sense, II (Sept., 1933), 6-7. 
39"The Drive Against Hunger," New Republic, 74 (March 29, 1933), 190. 
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rolled around, economic conditions worsened; farmers in their dis- 
content with administration relief measures, struck with some ensuing 
violence. Such discontent encouraged LIPA leaders to make another 
attempt to organize dissident groups. Disappointed with the Conti- 
nental Congress of May, the League decided to go it alone and called 
for a September conference, inviting labor and farm leaders to attend; 
the ultimate aim was to establish a party advocating a "Cooperative 
Commonwealth." Instead of compromising with capitalism as Roose- 
velt had done-by building a state capitalism-the LIPA demanded 
radical change and the substitution of industry based on profit for one 
truly consonant with the scientific and technological age. But again the 
conference did not form a third party; it created a subsidiary organiza- 
tion to increase and unite farm and labor support. Dewey explained 
this action to LIPA members in a newsletter: 
An important step toward founding a new American party of opposition 
was taken at the Conference for Progressive Political Action held at Chicago 
September 2, and 3. This Conference was called by the L.I.P.A. and more 
than two hundred delegates representing leading farm, labor, unemployed 
and professional organizations were in attendance. The Conference estab- 
lished the Farmer Labor Political Federation (you will find a detailed 
description of the F.L.P.F. on page 4 of this letter) which was empowered 
through its National Committee of Action to immediately build a member- 
ship organization composed of both affiliated organizations and individual 
members. As soon as sufficient memberships has been built up throughout 
the United States the National Committee of Action is instructed to call 
a national convention for the formal launching of the new party.40 
The philosopher was named the honorary chairman of the United 
Action Campaign Committee which, as Dewey explained, was to work 
to unite farm and labor support for the Farmer Labor Political Feder- 
ation; this organization would then form a new third party. "We 
must," Dewey wrote, "get down into the dirt and dust of the arena and 
fight for human rights in a practical, aggressive, realistic manner."41 
The LIPA and the FLPF did not merge because of their separate ap- 
peals, the former to the educated middle class Americans (intellectuals 
and socialists), the latter to discontented farmers and laborers. 
At this juncture of events, many older LIPA followers had switched 
over to Roosevelt and some to the Socialist Party. The former had 
aligned themselves with Roosevelt because, Dewey observed, "they 
regard the President as a Moses who is leading us out of the desolation 
of the depression." Dewey genuinely applauded what he had accom- 
plished, but the New Deal was merely an attempt to save capitalism 
40"Newsletter," United Actior Campaign Committee, undated except for the 
Yale University Library seal dated Nov. 27, 1933. 4lIbid. 
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and "only a new system which destroys the profit system can banish 
poverty and bring to the American people the economic liberation 
which modern science and technology is prepared to bestow upon 
them." For Dewey, Roosevelt could succeed only if he abandoned the 
Democratic Party; in this eventuality "it is urgent that we propagate 
our program and organize so that Roosevelt may be supported when 
he is on the right side," but if he should fail, we must be prepared to 
offer "an alternative to fascism."42 
Throughout 1933-34, Dewey continued to call for more radical 
political action than the New Deal offered. When the farm strikes 
occurred in the fall of 1933, as president of the People's Lobby, he 
wrote an open letter to President Roosevelt noting that "a reduction 
in mortgage debts and interest rates somewhat proportional to the 
reduction in prices of farm land seems imperatively needed."43 Indeed 
the Agriculture Adjustment Act, signed by Roosevelt in May to avert 
a strike offered some relief but not enough. After the October vio- 
lence Roosevelt sent Henry Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture, 
and Hugh Johnson, National Recovery Administrator, to the Midwest 
to mollify the farmers. By December, through increased loans and 
cash benefits, the farm strike was quelled. But discontent did work to 
increase third-party possibilities in the Midwest. For Dewey, Roose- 
velt's action consisted in merely treating symptoms, not causes. He 
advised that the sales tax, enacted under Hoover, be repealed; farm 
processing taxes and other consumer taxes put the burden where it 
hurt the most, on the depressed consumer. Dewey urged a revision of 
the Revenue Act to tax harder the higher income brackets.44 As far as 
he could see, Dewey thought Roosevelt was continuing Hoover's policy 
of aiding finance and business with little regard for the masses. The 
simplest way to remedy the situation, he proposed, was through higher 
taxes on higher incomes to support social relief programs.45 
The president of the People's Lobby criticized the manner in 
which the Roosevelt administration sought to raise revenues for the 
public works and unemployment relief that had been enacted. Next 
year's budget, Dewey suggested, would have to come close to ten 
billion-where will the money come from? The government will sell 
bonds at 4% interest, over a twenty-five year period. If some financiers, 
he argued, can afford to buy bonds, they can be taxed more heavily. 
The government's method enables the wealthy to increase their wealth 
42Ibid. 
43"Lobby Asks Special Session on Debts," People's Lobby Bulletin (Oct., 1933), 
III, vi, 1. 
44"Farm Processing and Other Consumption Taxes Must be Repealed," Ibid., 
(Nov., 1933), III, vii, 1. 
45"President's Policies Help Property Owners Chiefly," Ibid. (Jan., 1934), III, ix, 1. 
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at the expense of the poor.46 Dewey noted that the role of the govern- 
ment today has changed drastically from previous periods; no longer 
is its function merely that of a policeman. Now it must play the role of 
provider.47 To insure this role, the people through their government 
must take over the basic agencies on which industry and commerce 
depend. He recommended the socialization of banks, railroads, power 
companies, mines, and oil. Certainly, the Roosevelt administration, 
much more so than that of Hoover, has taken steps in that direction; 
but there can be no compromises with the old system. We cannot trust 
to halfway measures, but need a radical reorientation, a facing in 
another direction. Evidence demonstrated that the New Deal was try- 
ing to save the profit system.48 During subsequent months, as president 
of the People's Lobby, Dewey recommended complete socialization of 
all natural resources and basic industries, meaning thereby public own- 
ership through government ownership. This was a more radical pro- 
gram than the one he had offered in 1919, although even then he gave 
approval to state capitalism as a transitional stage; there is no reason 
to consider his position in 1934 as in any way contradictory to his 
earlier position, for, as he made clear to Thomas and Niebuhr, solu- 
tions grow out of the present conditions and are not generated a priori 
from some metaphysical scheme. To achieve the socialization he 
urged, he recommended taxation-extremely heavy on the top-which 
would allow the redistribution of wealth. Such taxation would provide 
the money to subsidize welfare programs and to compensate the pres- 
ent owners of the basic industries when they are socialized.49 
Thus from March 1934, as president of the People's Lobby, John 
Dewey became more forceful in rejecting halfway measures. By the fall 
of the same year he was certain "the Roosevelt experiment was a fail- 
ure." Discontent everywhere pointed to a second American revolution, 
probably not to the liking of Marxists, but allowing nonetheless "no 
truckling to capitalism." Continued strikes, farm revolts, and silent suf- 
fering were turning Americans to the left but not to "European models." 
Rather, they are seeking an "American radicalism," consistent with 
American traditions, signs of which are indicated by "the growth of the 
Farmer-Labor or 'third party' movement in the Middle West."50 
The FLPF had successfully capitalized on this growing disillusion- 
46"A Real Test of the Administration," Ibid. (Feb., 1934), III, x, 1. 
47Ibid. "The Federal Government has been obliged to abandon its role of interstate 
policeman" and "has now admitted its responsibility to provide work or maintenance 
for every American citizen who cannot obtain work." 
48"No Half Way House For America," Ibid. (Nov., 1934), IV, vii, 1. 
49"Socialization of Ground Rent," Ibid. (Jan., 1935), IV, ix, 1. 
50"Introduction," Challenge to the New Deal, ed. Alfred Bingham and Selden 
Rodman (New York, 1934), 1. 
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ment, and had been especially heartened by the formation of the Wis- 
consin Progressive Party, the formation of which was a direct result 
of the efforts of Thomas Amlie, the FLPF leader in that state. He had 
persuaded Robert La Follette to lead the Republican Progressives into 
the FLPF third-party movement. The party, formed at a May Con- 
vention (1934) at Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, was so successful in the 
fall election that it controlled the state. In Minnesota, where a 
Farmer-Labor Party already existed, Howard Y. Williams, FLPF 
leader there, gained the support of the leader of the Minnesota party, 
Governor Floyd Olson. On March 29, 1934, the Minnesota Convention 
adopted unanimously a highly socialistic platform. Olson was re- 
elected on the Farmer-Labor ticket. Naturally, the FLPF was en- 
couraged by these gains in Wisconsin and Minnesota and obtained the 
promise from both parties that they would join in a national third- 
party movement in the 1936 presidential race. Many events by the 
spring of 1935, conspired to augment third-party implementation; 
Donald R. McCoy observes: 
The depressed payrolls in manufacturing industries remained fairly stable 
from about April, 1934, to the fall of the following year. The prevailing trend of 
wholesale prices for farm products in 1935 and the first quarter of 1936 was 
downward. Between early 1933 and 1934, unemployment rolls had been re- 
duced 16 percent, but from 1934 to 1935 the number of jobless persons de- 
creased only by about 6 percent.5' 
In addition, labor was disturbed by Congress's failure to act on its 
behalf, and following the Supreme Court's decision that the National 
Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional (May 27, 1935), a series 
of strikes occurred. Many labor groups in their dissatisfaction began to 
look to the FLPF. Successful third-party activities in California, Wash- 
ington, and Oregon and the growing disenchantment with Roosevelt on 
the part of congressional progressives heightened LIPA's optimism. 
Rexford Tugwell, one of Roosevelt's braintrusters and colleague of 
Dewey's, was increasingly dissatisfied with Roosevelt's appeasement. 
If these dissident forces could be united, they could form an irresistible 
front in 1936; but cooperation was difficult to attain, especially from 
the socialists. Norman Thomas sought to strengthen his hand by 
working for a united front with the Communists. This caused a split in 
the Socialist Party. The Communists, on the other hand, tempered 
their aggressive dogmatism by pledging to work with liberal radical 
groups on a common front. This easing of relations between socialists, 
liberals, and communists, however, proved to be fatal to LIPA efforts, 
for the League officials were avowedly anticommunist. 
51McCoy, 72. 
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Nonetheless, the FLPF thought the time was ripe for the formation 
of the long awaited third party; they feared delay might allow some 
other independent group the opportunity to initiate the party in a way 
to be divisive. The FLPF first looked to enlist the support of congres- 
sional progressives but this effort was no more successful than Dewey's 
1930 attempt to engage Norris' support. The progressives were united 
in their views on legislative policy but each was too much of a leader to 
be a follower. Middle West leaders, Amlie and Williams, were able to 
induce support from Farmer-Labor groups there; a conference was 
called in Chicago, July 5, and 6, 1935. The response was excellent-all 
radical groups attending, except for the communists. However, instead 
of creating a new party, another organization-again so as to be most 
inclusive in uniting contending groups-was formed: The American 
Commonwealth Political Federation. The platform adopted was con- 
sistent with proposals urged by Midwestern groups since the 1890's. 
Generally, most members were encouraged about the possibilities for 
1936, although few thought the new party could gain control of the 
presidency; but a powerful showing could be used to pressure the 
administration in certain LIPA directions. Howard Y. Williams, 
FLPF leader in Wisconsin, was confident that by 1940 the new party 
could be in control and Dewey agreed.52 
Despite these initially auspicious conditions, difficulties arose over 
the feasibility of running a presidential candidate in 1936 under the 
third-party banner. Some thought the candidates should be restricted 
to state and congressional offices. It was feared that a poor showing in 
the presidential race might ruin, for good, third-party possibilities in 
the future. When the newly formed ACPF moved to have the Min- 
nesota Farmer-Labor Party call for a third-party convention, Gover- 
nor Olson was undecided about running a presidential nominee, for he 
feared a failure in 1936 would cripple third-party efforts for subsequent 
years. Olson was ambivalent at first, saying he would leave the decision 
up to the convention-then he reneged. It seems he had been making 
deals with Roosevelt behind the scenes and as the convention drew 
nearer early in May, he publicly counseled his party to boycott the 
convention if a presidential candidate were voted. He feared a third- 
party presidential candidate would aid Republicans by dividing liber- 
als; this action proved so divisive as to knock the wind out of the sails 
of the convention before it even met on May 30, in Chicago. 
What had promised to be one of the most energetic and best orga- 
nized third-party movements in American history was deflected by 
factionalism. But there were other oppositional forces that played a 
part in dividing third-party efforts before they could congeal. The 
agrarian leader, Milo Reno-an avid third party promoter-died 
early in May; again as with Olson, some feared a third party might 
52Ibid., 93. 
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aid reactionary forces, so they went over to Roosevelt. Another 
significant disadvantage was the infiltration into the ACPF of com- 
munists; indeed this organization had become dominated by them and 
at the convention they had free rein. Knowing this, several FLPF 
and LIPA leaders refused to attend at the last moment. Consequently, 
no third party was formed. This failure of the ACPF in 1936 effectively 
killed the LIPA. Its leaders for the most part, like Thomas Amlie, 
Howard Y. Williams, and Paul Douglas, swung over to Roosevelt, as 
did Oswald Garrison Villard, the editor of The Nation, and Alfred 
Bingham, the editor of Common Sense, the official organ of LIPA.53 
And John Dewey? He expressed his disappointment: 
I intend to vote for Norman Thomas for President. It was a disappoint- 
ment that no genuine mass third party was organized, especially in view of 
the fact that the so-called Union Party is a union of inflationists and semi- 
fascist elements. I realize that fear of reactionary Republicanism will lead 
many to vote for Roosevelt who have no faith in the Democratic Party; but I 
do not believe that the actual difference between the policies of the old 
parties will be great, whoever is elected. I think the Republican Party is 
conducting a campaign under false pretense.54 
In evaluating LIPA activities, one could claim that the movement 
was a failure in terms of its immediate objectives; yet, even here the 
LIPA had sponsored and helped to elect many third-party candidates 
as congressmen, governors, and senators. Thus, the seeds of a new 
political philosophy were planted in governmental offices. As an edu- 
cational institution, its primary office, the LIPA played a vital role in 
informing the public of the realities of the economic collapse, thus pre- 
paring the way, ideologically, for the acceptance of the new role of the 
government. Indeed the New Deal did not go far enough in remedying 
the underlying causes of economic inequality and instability, but there 
can be little doubt that it paved the way for further governmental 
inroads into banking, business, and industry, and the educational work 
performed by the LIPA gave support to even that limited governmen- 
tal control. 
While the New Deal was not, to Dewey's mind, radical enough in 
terms of his socialism, it was nonetheless greatly under the influence 
of his instrumentalism and pragmatism even if this pragmatism was 
more ad hoc and headless than his own. Among the Roosevelt Brain 
Trusters were Dewey's Columbia colleagues, A. A. Berle, Jr. and 
Rexford Tugwell, who "applied their interpretation of Dewey's ex- 
perimental method to the problems of New Deal recovery and 
reform."55 Rexford Tugwell, in 1920, had become an instructor at 
531bid., 108-13. 
54"How They Are Voting: II," New Republic, 88 (Oct. 9, 1936), 249. 
55Sidney Ratner, "Pragmatism in America," Essays in American Historiography, 
ed. Donald Sheehan and Harold C. Syrett (New York, 1960), 210. 
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Columbia and was greatly influenced by "faculty members, especially 
John Dewey."56 Tugwell acknowledged Dewey's influence, and even 
if he had not done so explicitly, his pragmatic approach to social and 
economic problems, his wedding of the social sciences and philosophy 
in dealing "with the insistent problems of industrialism," and his belief 
in the application of science and technology and experimentation to 
social planning, would have been sufficient to demonstrate his in- 
debtedness.57 
Dewey could not accept Roosevelt's compromise with capitalism 
for he saw clearly that the New Deal permitted power and rule to 
remain essentially in the same hands as those that had brought the 
country to its present state-dominated as those hands are by the 
profit motive. Michael Harrington in his most recent work has shown 
that the Roosevelt compromise lies at the bottom of many of our 
present economic and social problems.58 
Dewey's activities, his solutions and commitments during the 
Depression, force us to seriously question Morton White's charge 
that Dewey's genre of liberalism "supplies us with no particular or 
specific political position that can be acted on, only a plea for intel- 
ligence."59 Dewey's experimental approach to political, social, and 
economic problems does not require adherence to dogmas-to some 
this seems a disadvantage. But attention to specific conditions leads 
to specific and workable solutions, calculated to reconstruct a prob- 
lematic situation. His vision was neither narrow nor ad hoc. He com- 
mitted his liberal following to a socialistic program of reform, yet 
remaining within the American democratic tradition; he saw clearly 
the need to put the major industries into the hands of the people so as 
to serve the public sector and not merely the private. To achieve the 
democratization of industry, he sought to use power, political organi- 
zation, and pressure-not the violent overthrow of the government. 
Taxation instead of confiscation was to be employed to secure the 
socialization of banks, railroads, oil, and power. Indeed one might 
criticize Dewey's proposals-their feasibility-but it seems well beside 
the point to write that his political liberalism "commits us to no 
specific course of action."60 
Sacred Heart University. 
"6Bernard Sternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Brunswick, 1964), 6. 
57Ibid., 15. 
8sToward a Democratic Left, A Radical Program for a New Majority (New York, 
1968), passim. 
59Social Thought in America, The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston, 1957), 201. 
60Ibid. 
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